Political unrest still remain in Cambodia after national election on July 28, 2013

On September 14, 2013, the King Sihamony host a meeting with both parties leadership (Cambodian People Party (CPP) and Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) to solve the problem happening. The King gave a speech to the both party leaders to understand and tolerance each other  as well as keep national safety. Through this meeting, the both parties agreed to meet again on September 16, 2013 by formula 6 plus 6. It means 6 members from CPP and 6 members from CNRP to discuss furthermore. The King was doubt hollowed the mind map of CPP because when he was in China, he issued a letter to the people to keep in silence and the political party should respect the election result. The King also issued a letter to response the chairman of National Election Committee (NEC) that he would invite all elected persons to attend the first Assembly meeting on Sept 23, even though the concern problems have not been resolved. Following this, the King also handed the invitation letters to the both political parties leaders. However, The King did not response the CNRP's letter to ask him to make intervention on election irregular, particularly the creation of independence body to investigate the election issues. 

After meeting with King, CCP issued a statement to support the King's idea to appeal the people to keep silently. However, CNRP had meeting with its members and decided to not attend the first Assembly meeting, if the matters has not been resolved properly. Is it ashamed for the King for this matter?  Hmm in the democratic society, the people is the owner of the country so the King just only the facilitator so he didn't have power to force anyone to follow him but he is granted power through Cambodian Constitution. Article 8 of Constitution said "The King of Cambodia shall be a symbol of unity and eternity of the nation. The King shall be guarantor of the national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia the protector of rights and freedom for all citizens and the guarantor of international treaties." if no one follows what king's recommendation, there was no article to punish such persons.

If we look at the Election Day, it's found many irregular problems happened around the country. Some people were missed their name from the vote list. Some had double or triple name at the different places. This mandate, the people protected their vote by themselves by observing the election full day. They dismissed some Vietnamese who wanted to vote as well.  Through the social media, it's found much news that broadcast the issues happening at many stations. It also had conflict between staff of NEC and people who lost names and reached to burn two police vans.  

From the beginning CPP has a strongly stand that everything election conflict shall be solved through on exist mechanism [through NEC and Constitutional Council (CC)]. However, the both organ (NEC and CC) have been accused to work under supervision of CPP. It has been seen that the result of preliminary result which issued by NEC on July 28 was not changed as the final result. It's accused that the preliminary result, NEC didn't have enough supporting documents or didn't get all data from the pooling stations but after CC rejected all complaints from CNRP, NEC announced the result as same as what it pronounced from the previous time. The ways of CC resolve the controversial also has been accused to bias CPP by issuing the decision which favor CPP. Through checking the safety box A, the majority the safety package became unsafe because all documents were opened or not have figure in them.  Some figure also corrected the data over there. Why CC didn't order to open all safe packages to prove that everything is acceptable?  

The resort, CNPR used mass demonstration to favor their voters. However, CNRP still demands CPP to join with them to create the independence body which involve from UN and NGOs to investigate the irregular election. This request has been rejected by CPP. The people thought that if CPP still won the election, why is CPP afraid to establish the independence body to investigate the election? This is why the people always wonder in their mind.  

CNRP organized its mass demonstration on September 7, 2013 and there were no incident reported. However CNPR still organized its mass demonstration which starts from September 15-17, 2013 to allow people to express their feeling even the Ministry of Interior (MoI) agreed only one day demonstration.  MoI issued a letter to agree CNRP organize mass demonstration but it's not more than 10,000 participants. It's not allowed to walk or march from the Freedom Park. However, CNRP still demand to march from its headquarters to Freedom Park. Today, the participants who attend the mass demonstration are tenting on the freedom park. From tomorrow, we don't know the problem happen. Can demonstration solve the problem or is it the lock way to both political parties' meeting on September 16? Does this action still be political unrest?

                        People who sleep at the freedom park for attending mass demonstration on Sept 15. 

The monks marched for people resolution on Sept 14, 2013. The monks also requested the Supreme Monks to not restrict monk freedom to participate the social events. 

We believe that everything can be solved by peaceful means.  

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Fraud, Irregularities, and Intimidation During the 2013 National Assembly Elections

On July 28, 2013, Cambodians went to the polls in the millions, eager to cast ballots in the country’s hotly contested National Assembly elections. Many of them, however, were improperly turned away. Observers, who were certified by the Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (NICFEC), also documented other worrisome irregularities, some indicating the use of fraud and vote rigging. As a result of these findings, which are described in this report, LICADHO supports calls for a genuine independent investigation and a polling station level recount with independent observers before the results are finalized.

This report compiles key observations from 173 staff and partners who visited over 100 polling stations. There are 19,009 polling stations in Cambodia. As such, this report is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of election day irregularities, but instead offers a snapshot revealing the need for further investigation.

Overall, observers witnessed serious discrepancies in an alarming percentage of the stations visited. The issues can be grouped into three main areas: voter roll irregularities, including inexplicably missing names and similar denials of the right to vote; indications of intentional fraud or vote rigging; and intimidation or harassment.

In most stations visited, LICADHO observers spoke with individuals who had verified their registration prior to the election day, only to find their names missing from the voter rolls upon arrival at their polling station. Similarly, several individuals were turned away after being told that someone else had already voted in their name – often the earlier voter had used a commune chief-awarded identity certificate in lieu of a photo ID. Would-be voters were also denied their right to vote on improper bases, such as their failure to bring their voter information slip to the polls.

Perhaps more alarmingly, LICADHO observers determined that voter rolls at several of the polling stations visited had been intentionally manipulated. In one, LICADHO observers spoke with individuals who freely admitted that they were part of a large group that had been brought to the commune to vote by their employer, despite the fact that they had not resided or registered in that commune. LICADHO also observed groups of well-dressed individuals arriving at certain stations in convoys of luxury cars. In those instances, local residents approached LICADHO observers stating that the individuals were not from the commune in question. Finally, in Siem Reap, LICADHO observers saw mobile military units arriving to vote in new polling stations – the units had travelled from Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear and slept in nearby pagodas before arriving at the special stations to vote. All of these case studies are described in detail below.

LICADHO also observed numerous instances of disturbing intimidation. In some instances, observers heard from residents who felt intimidated by the presence of party officials and local authorities inside the polling stations. On occasion, those officials were witnessed taking notes on who had voted. In Kampong Cham, LICADHO’s observer himself was questioned at length the night before the election. LICADHO observers also witnessed crowds at certain polling stations who were barring individuals from voting based on their apparent ethnicity. Such discrimination also clearly merits further investigation.

Although LICADHO was only able to visit a small number of stations, relatively speaking, and was unable to monitor stations for the entire duration of the Election Day, the below observations unequivocally demonstrate the need for further in-depth investigations and additional procedures before the vote results can be finalized.

Please download this report by clicking here

Cambodia’s 2013 Elections: A Measure of Political Inclusion?

Please link to original source: http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2013/07/24/cambodias-2013-elections-a-measure-of-political-inclusion/

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July 24, 2013

By Silas Everett

Cambodians will go to the polls on July 28 for the fifth National Assembly election since the U.N. organized the historic 1993 elections. Victory for the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) is expected by many to be a foregone conclusion – a continuation of Hun Sen’s 28-year reign as prime minister, one of the longest serving leaders in Asia.

Voter support for the CPP has remained steady over the last decade. The International Republican Institute’s (IRI) annual polling over the last seven years shows that roughly 80 percent of Cambodians believe the country is headed in the right direction. Photo/Karl Grobl

However, the 11th-hour return of the self-exiled opposition leader Sam Rainsy last Friday, which culminated in a welcome rally attended by an estimated 100,000 supporters, has re-energized his coalition, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), though the excitement was soon subdued when election authorities ruled on Monday that they would reject Rainsy’s application to run (although Rainsy is protesting this decision).

In addition, Sam Rainsy’s return failed to make nation-wide news in the government-dominated media. This is significant because the bulk of Cambodia’s citizens, 80 percent of whom live in rural areas, lack access to alternative sources of news and information, except those that amplify the CPP party line.

On top of that, a National Democratic Institute study of the quality of the government’s voter list found that 10.4 percent of voters listed could not be located and 9.4 percent of eligible voters had been deleted from the list. The fact the National Election Commission has not approved Sam Rainsy’s candidacy and thus he will not be on the ballot underlines many points on the opposition’s platform over the cooptation of the state by the CPP.

Meanwhile, the CNRP’s campaign efforts have been tarnished since their debut due to what some view as politically motivated use of the media and judicial system by the CPP, targeting the CNRP’s deputy, Kem Sokha, with legal claims of genocide denial and reneging on child support. Regardless of the CPP’s democratically questionable political tactics, it is important to understand why it remains such a formidable player in Cambodia.

Voter support for the CPP has remained steady over the last decade. The International Republican Institute’s (IRI) annual polling over the last seven years shows that roughly 80 percent of Cambodians believe the country is headed in the right direction. This is owed in part to the fact that in the last two decades, Hun Sen has effectively centralized power in Cambodia. It must be remembered that few nations have suffered as much terror as Cambodians did under Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. Even today, it is no small feat that this year’s campaigning has been conducted without major violent incident or political assassination and many Cambodians, especially those of the older generation, have taken note.

Much of the CPP’s legitimacy can be directly linked to the declining poverty rate which has been halved in the last decade. Behind Myanmar, Cambodians have experienced the second-most rapid rate of improvement in Human Development Index among the countries in the lower Mekong region in the last 10 years. Not only have there been steady increases in household income, but citizens have also benefited from improvements in local infrastructure, including roads, schools, and pagodas. In fact, 74 percent of those in IRI’s poll who said Cambodia is headed in the right direction said so because there are more roads now.

Cambodians have experienced the second-most rapid rate of improvement in Human Development Index among the countries in the lower Mekong region in the last 10 years. Photo/Karl Grobl

To date, the CPP has arguably achieved such gains through consolidating a party structure which has extended its hierarchy from Phnom Penh to almost every village in the country. Although the party’s super-structure has buttressed the state’s security apparatus and administrative functions, the party may increasingly find difficulty in controlling itself. Roughly 20 percent of Cambodians in IRI’s poll said that they think the country is headed in the wrong direction. Corruption and land-grabbing have been their overriding concerns. Both Cambodia’s civil society organizations and international donors echo these concerns and have pushed for democratic reforms to address the many outstanding cases of corruption and human rights abuses.

Despite skepticism around the election, some important takeaways have already emerged. First, CNRP’s ability to spark strong interest among younger voters, particularly in urban areas, clearly demonstrates that youth under the age of 25, which accounts for 53.8 percent of Cambodia’s population, have a radically different set of expectations than their parents. This new generation is more educated, consumerist, and in search of higher living standards. Increasingly drawn to urban areas for work, Khmer youth do not carry the same willingness as older generations to be detached from politics or bound by traditional social norms. Better jobs and improved access to services, especially in urban Cambodia, are emerging as priorities for youth in this election.

The ever-popular demand for more rural roads and basic infrastructure, such as irrigation, cannot be overlooked either. Decentralization has thus far been essential to the CPP’s success, where providing budgets and greater autonomy to elected commune authorities have resulted in more infrastructure projects like road building. Still, there is a long way to go; simply building more roads may not keep citizens satisfied.

There are signs that further decentralization could bring a wealth of other benefits, including improved services in health and education. In order to reap these benefits, local-level budgets need to be increased. Currently, the budgets of all local administrative authorities combined are still a fraction of the national budget.

Going forward, it may be that any political benefits from further decentralization may likely have less to do with more resource transfers and institutional capacity-building, and more to do with finding alternative ways to curb the excesses of power, such as improving access to information and public participation.

With poor protection of human rights on the one hand and increasing prosperity on the other, Cambodians face a conundrum when choosing a new government. This election may be a foregone conclusion in this instance, but at its core rests the question of whether a “1.5 party” system for the country will be stable over time.

In the book, Why Nations Fail, by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, the authors’ sweeping review of political systems over the millennia suggests that economically open but politically closed states have either had to open up politically to continue to grow or risk economic stagnation and at worst, collapse.

With concerns over China’s impending economic slowdown, upon which Cambodia relies heavily, maintaining national economic growth will test any Cambodian government in the next five years. Over the long term, if Acemoglu and Robinson are correct, Cambodia’s continued growth may be the best measure of political inclusiveness.

Silas Everett is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in Cambodia. He can be reached at severett@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.